Faust CTF 2022 - Digital Seconds Ago
Description
The challenge consists of a single ELF binary called digital-seconds-ago, which runs as a systemd service.
Analysis of the binary
After analyzing the binary, you can see that it uses a database, which is created via the following SQL command:
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users(uid INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, name TEXT, pubkey TEXT, profile TEXT);
After the database is created, the service provides the following actions:
- Register: give a username, a public key and a profile, which will be stored in the database.
- Login: give a username, then get a challenge (a few random bytes); if you can sign the challenge with your private key (that corresponds to the public key given at registration), then the login is successful, and you can read the profile.
- Users: print the list of users in the database
- Pubkey: prints the public key of the given user
- Help: prints the help
- Exit: exits the program
Where are the flags?
The flags are in the profile field of the database. In each round, the organizers register a new user with the profile being the flag.
Getting the flags
If you successfully login, then the profile of that user is printed; but in order to log in, you need to find a vulnerability in the cryptographic system that checks the signature. This was the harder way to solve a challenge, but there was a shortcut hidden in the binary.
The main(0x22d0) function reads a line, checks if it matches one of the actions mentioned before, and if it does, it calls the handler function for that action. However, there is an extra check, which is in a function called by main, let’s call it check_backdoor(0x3810). Here is the decompiled version of the function:
undefined8 check_backdoor(char *command)
{
long lVar1;
size_t command_len;
undefined8 uVar2;
undefined8 uVar3;
long in_FS_OFFSET;
lVar1 = *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28);
command_len = strlen(command);
uVar3 = 0;
uVar2 = 0;
if ((((((command_len == 0xc) && (*command != command[1])) && (command[2] != command[5])) &&
((uVar3 = uVar2, command[3] != command[4] && (*command == command[0xb])))) &&
((command[1] == command[10] && ((command[2] == command[9] && (command[3] == command[8]))))))
&& (command[4] == command[7])) {
if (command[5] == command[6]) {
puts("... ok, but only 2 past seconds");
uVar3 = 1;
}
else {
uVar3 = 0;
}
}
if (lVar1 == *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
return uVar3;
}
/* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
__stack_chk_fail();
}
We can see that this function returns 1 if the following conditions are met:
- The
commandis 12 characters long - The
commandis a palindrome word - There are no identical characters in the first six letters of
command
It is really easy to come up with a solution, for example: "abcdeffedcba".
Looking back at the main function, we see that if we pass the check, it will call another function:
iVar1 = check_backdoor(input);
if (iVar1 != 0) {
do_backdoor();
goto LAB_001023b0;
}
The do_backdoor(0x38c0) function runs the following SQL query:
"SELECT name, profile FROM users ORDER BY uid DESC LIMIT 2"
It selects the last two entries in the database (ordered by uid), and prints their name and profile. Since the profile contains the flag, we can just read it.
Summary
The solution is really simple: you just have to send "abcdeffedcba", and then you get two flags.
Patching the backdoor
Here is the relevant part of the assembly code of the main function:
0x000023ff 4889ef mov rdi, rbp
0x00002402 e809140000 call check_backdoor
0x00002407 85c0 test eax, eax
┌─< 0x00002409 7545 jne 0x2450 ; here we jump to the backdoor, if the check succeeded
│ 0x0000240b 83c301 add ebx, 1
│ 0x0000240e 4983c710 add r15, 0x10
│ 0x00002412 83fb06 cmp ebx, 6
│ 0x00002415 75d4 jne 0x23eb
│ 0x00002417 488d3d511f00. lea rdi, str.unknown_command
│ 0x0000241e e85dfcffff call sym.imp.puts
│ 0x00002423 eb8b jmp 0x23b0
│ 0x00002425 0f1f00 nop dword [rax]
│ 0x00002428 488d3d2c1f00. lea rdi, str.fail_to_get_command
│ 0x0000242f e84c030000 call 0x2780
│ 0x00002434 eba8 jmp 0x23de
│ 0x00002436 662e0f1f8400. nop word cs:[rax + rax]
│ 0x00002440 4863db movsxd rbx, ebx
│ 0x00002443 48c1e304 shl rbx, 4
│ 0x00002447 ff541c08 call qword [rsp + rbx + 8]
│ 0x0000244b e960ffffff jmp 0x23b0
└─> 0x00002450 31c0 xor eax, eax
0x00002452 e869140000 call do_backdoor
0x00002457 e954ffffff jmp 0x23b0`
There are many ways to fix it, e.g. replace the call to check_backdoor with xor eax, eax (and some nop-s), or you can modify the check_backdoor and do_backdoor functions, too. I chose to replace the conditinonal jump with two nop-s so that we never jump to call do_backdoor. Here is the modified code:
0x000023ff 4889ef mov rdi, rbp
0x00002402 e809140000 call check_backdoor
0x00002407 85c0 test eax, eax
0x00002409 90 nop ; conditional jump replaced with nops, hence we never jump to `call do_backdoor`
0x0000240a 90 nop
0x0000240b 83c301 add ebx, 1
0x0000240e 4983c710 add r15, 0x10
0x00002412 83fb06 cmp ebx, 6
0x00002415 75d4 jne 0x23eb
0x00002417 488d3d511f00. lea rdi, str.unknown_command
0x0000241e e85dfcffff call sym.imp.puts
0x00002423 eb8b jmp 0x23b0
0x00002425 0f1f00 nop dword [rax]
0x00002428 488d3d2c1f00. lea rdi, str.fail_to_get_command
0x0000242f e84c030000 call 0x2780
0x00002434 eba8 jmp 0x23de
0x00002436 662e0f1f8400. nop word cs:[rax + rax]
0x00002440 4863db movsxd rbx, ebx
0x00002443 48c1e304 shl rbx, 4
0x00002447 ff541c08 call qword [rsp + rbx + 8]
0x0000244b e960ffffff jmp 0x23b0
0x00002450 31c0 xor eax, eax
0x00002452 e869140000 call do_backdoor
0x00002457 e954ffffff jmp 0x23b0